

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 049286
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01
SAJ-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05
EA-07 /097 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/NTB:RMIKULAK
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:WSTEARMAN
PM/DCA:HPHELPS
EUR/C:GHUMPHREY

-----050917Z 039828 /21

R 050143Z MAR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 049286

E.O. 11652: X-GDS-1

TAGS: PARM, CCD, GW

SUBJECT: FRG PROPOSAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS

1. SUMMARY. FRG EMBOFF PRESENTED PROPOSAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS IN NATO TO ACDA ACTING DIRECTOR SLOSS ON MARCH 3. NOTE SUGGESTED THAT CONSULTATIONS BE HELD IN NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON MARCH 22 WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A CW CONVENTION BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT BEGIN. US RESPONDED ON MARCH 4 THAT, UNTIL USG REVIEW OF CW POLICY COMPLETED, US PARTICIPATION IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS COULD ONLY BE VERY LIMITED. IN NEAR FUTURE, HOWEVER, WE EXPECT TO PROPOSE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 049286

TIONS IN BONN ON ALTERNATIVES UNDER STUDY AS PART OF CW REVIEW. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING MARCH 3 CALL ON ACTING ACDA DIRECTOR SLOSS, MINISTER-COUNSELOR SCHAUER OF FRG EMBASSY PRESENTED FRG "DISCUSSION PAPER" ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS. A RESPONSE ON FRIDAY, MARCH 4, WAS REQUESTED, IF POSSIBLE. TEXT

OF FRG DISCUSSION PAPER FOLLOWS:

QUOTE 'DISCUSSION PAPER'

THE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN BRINGING ABOUT THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE LATELY BEEN INTENSIFIED, IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUS DRAFTS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN,

THE CCD HAS BEFORE IT A BRITISH DRAFT WHICH IS TO BE DEBATED DURING THIS YEAR'S SESSION. ITALY HAS SUGGESTED THE SETTING UP OF A CCD WORKING GROUP TO NEGOTIATE A CW CONVENTION, AND LAST YEAR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CONDUCTED BILATERAL TALKS ON ASPECTS OF A CW PROHIBITION, WHICH ARE TO BE CONTINUED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE A CONVENTION CONCLUDED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THEREFORE WELCOMES THIS INTENSIFICATION OF THE DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, A PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFFECTS THE STRATEGY AND THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE THAT A REAL EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON AT LEAST THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF A CONVENTION BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ARE INITIATED OR AN UNDERSTANDING SOUGHT WITH THIRD STATES. THIS VIEW WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTED DURING THE LAST ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG DISARMAMENT EXPERTS IN OCTOBER 1976.

IN VIEW OF THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE DEEM IT DESIRABLE THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD CONSIDER THIS MATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE DO NOT WANT THE COMMITTEE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 049286

TO DISCUSS COMPLICATED TECHNICAL DETAILS, WHICH ARE THE CONCERN OF GROUPS OF EXPERTS, BUT MERELY TO TRY TO ESTABLISH AGREEMENT INITIALLY ON SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES. THE FOLLOWING FIVE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY WORDED IN GENERAL TERMS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT. THEY ARE INTENDED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND NEED MORE SPECIFIC ELABORATION. WE SUGGEST THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSS THE MATTER AT THEIR MEETING ON 22 MARCH 1977.

1. THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION MUST BE SUCH THAT THE EAST WILL NOT BE PLACED AT AN ADVANTAGE AND THE SECURITY OF THE WEST WILL NOT BE IMPAIRED.
2. DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURE AND USE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES MUST NOT BE HAMPERED.
3. VERIFICATION SHOULD BE REGULATED IN SUCH WAY THAT OBSERVANCE OF THE CONVENTION CAN BE CHECKED UPON WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY. THE B-WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE

ENMOD-CONVENTION IN WHICH SECURITY ASPECTS PLAY A LESSER
ROLE CANNOT SERVE AS A MODEL IN THIS RESPECT.

4. THE CONVENTION MUST NOT CONTAIN ANY DISCRIMINATION OF
STATES. A BAN ON MANUFACTURE WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO ALL
STATES EQUALLY. A C-WEAPONS CONVENTION SHOULD NOT ONLY EN-
VISAGE THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

BUT EQUALLY THE STOCKPILING OF WARFARE AGENTS AND SHOULD
THEREFORE PROVIDE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS.

5. GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ENSURING EFFECTIVE
VERIFICATION, A STEP BY STEP APPROACH SHOULD BE ADOPTED.
END QUOTE.

3. ON FRIDAY, MARCH 4, NON-PAPER WAS GIVEN TO FRG EMBOFF
IN RESPONSE TO FRG DISCUSSION PAPER. TEXT OF NON-PAPER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 049286

FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE CONCERN OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC THAT, IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLI-
CATIONS OF A CW PROHIBITION, CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NATO
ALLIES BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TEXT OF A
CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) CONVENTION BEGIN. THE US BELIEVES IT
WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR NATO TO STUDY
PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GOVERN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION ON CW. WHILE WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO A PROPOSAL
TO HOLD SUCH CONSULTATIONS DURING MARCH, US PARTICIPATION
IN NATO DISCUSSIONS AT THIS TIME COULD ONLY BE VERY LIMITED
FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED BELOW.

2. THE US IS PRESENTLY IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A STUDY OF
CW POLICY ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND MILITARY POS-
TURE ALTERNATIVES. BEFORE TAKING DECISIONS ON THE US POSI-
TION FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, THE US WISHES TO INFORM THE
PRINCIPAL ALLIES OF THE NATURE OF THIS STUDY AND TO OBTAIN
THEIR VIEWS. WE HAVE BEEN PREPARING A PROPOSAL TO HOLD BI-
LATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG IN BONN JUST PRIOR TO
THE CCD MEETINGS ON CW. SUCH CONSULTATIONS COULD BE MUCH
MORE EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE HELD IN THE BROADER NATO FORUM.
WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT THE PROPOSAL WITHIN A FEW
DAYS.

3. SINCE THE US HAS NOT COMPLETED ITS POLICY REVIEW WE
WILL NOT BE PREPARED IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO TAKE A DEFINITIVE
POSITION ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES PRESENTED IN THE FRG DIS-
CUSSION PAPER, EVEN THOUGH THEY APPEAR GENERALLY CONSIST-

ENT WITH OUR OWN VIEWS. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME FULL
DISCUSSION IN NATO ONCE OUR POLICY REVIEW IS COMPLETED.

4. US REPRESENTATIVES AT THE CCD INFORMAL MEETINGS ON CW
AND AT THE BILATERAL US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS IN EARLY APRIL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 049286

WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO CW
LIMITATIONS. THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE AUTHORIZED TO ENTER
INTO NEGOTIATIONS OF A CW AGREEMENT.

5. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE WESTERN GROUP AT THE CCD
TO DISCUSS THE CCD'S INFORMAL MEETINGS ON CW IN THE NEAR
FUTURE WITH A VIEW TO ARRIVING AT A COMMON APPROACH. WE
WOULD WELCOME ANY VIEWS OF THE FRG ON THIS QUESTION. END
TEXT.
CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 049286
ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /011 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:ACDA:NTB:RMKULAK

APPROVED BY:ACDA:IR:WSTEARMAN

-----171921Z 080497 /56

R 170445Z MAR 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 049286

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM SECSTATE WASHDC DATED MARCH 5,
1977 SENT BONN INFO GENEVA, LONDON, MOSCOW, NATO IS REPEATED
TO YOU: QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 049286

E.O. 11652: X-GDS-1

TAGS: PARM, CCD, GW

SUBJECT: FRG PROPOSAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS

1. SUMMARY. FRG EMBOFF PRESENTED PROPOSAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS IN NATO TO ACDA ACTING DIRECTOR SLOSS ON MARCH 3. NOTE SUGGESTED THAT CONSULTATIONS BE HELD IN NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE ON MARCH 22 WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A CW CONVENTION BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON A TEXT BEGIN. US RESPONDED ON MARCH 4 THAT, UNTIL USG REVIEW OF CW POLICY COMPLETED, US PARTICIPATION IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS COULD ONLY BE VERY LIMITED. IN NEAR FUTURE, HOWEVER, WE EXPECT TO PROPOSE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN BONN ON ALTERNATIVES UNDER STUDY AS PART OF CW RE-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 049286

VIEW. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING MARCH 3 CALL ON ACTING ACDA DIRECTOR SLOSS, MINISTER-COUNSELOR SCHAUER OF FRG EMBASSY PRESENTED FRG "DISCUSSION PAPER" ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS. A RESPONSE ON FRIDAY, MARCH 4, WAS REQUESTED, IF POSSIBLE. TEXT OF FRG DISCUSSION PAPER FOLLOWS:

QUOTE 'DISCUSSION PAPER'

THE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN BRINGING ABOUT THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE LATELY BEEN INTENSIFIED, IN ADDITION TO PREVIOUS DRAFTS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN,

THE CCD HAS BEFORE IT A BRITISH DRAFT WHICH IS TO BE DEBATED DURING THIS YEAR'S SESSION. ITALY HAS SUGGESTED THE SETTING UP OF A CCD WORKING GROUP TO NEGOTIATE A CW CONVENTION, AND LAST YEAR THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CONDUCTED BILATERAL TALKS ON ASPECTS OF A CW PROHIBITION, WHICH ARE TO BE CONTINUED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE A CONVENTION CONCLUDED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THEREFORE WELCOMES THIS INTENSIFICATION OF THE DISCUSSION. HOWEVER, A PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AFFECTS THE STRATEGY AND THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE THAT A REAL EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON AT LEAST THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF A CONVENTION BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ARE INITIATED OR AN UNDERSTANDING SOUGHT WITH THIRD STATES. THIS VIEW WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTED DURING THE LAST ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG DISARMAMENT EXPERTS IN OCTOBER 1976.

IN VIEW OF THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, WE DEEM IT DESIRABLE THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD CONSIDER THIS MATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE DO NOT WANT THE COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS COMPLICATED TECHNICAL DETAILS, WHICH ARE THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 049286

CONCERN OF GROUPS OF EXPERTS, BUT MERELY TO TRY TO ESTABLISH AGREEMENT INITIALLY ON SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES. THE FOLLOWING FIVE PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN DELIBERATELY WORDED IN GENERAL TERMS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT. THEY ARE INTENDED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND NEED MORE SPECIFIC ELABORATION. WE SUGGEST THAT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE DISCUSS THE MATTER AT THEIR MEETING ON 22 MARCH 1977.

1. THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION MUST BE SUCH THAT THE EAST WILL NOT BE PLACED AT AN ADVANTAGE AND THE SECURITY OF THE WEST WILL NOT BE IMPAIRED.

2. DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURE AND USE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES MUST NOT BE HAMPERED.

3. VERIFICATION SHOULD BE REGULATED IN SUCH WAY THAT OBSERVANCE OF THE CONVENTION CAN BE CHECKED UPON WITH SUFFICIENT CERTAINTY. THE B-WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE ENMOD-CONVENTION IN WHICH SECURITY ASPECTS PLAY A LESSER ROLE CANNOT SERVE AS A MODEL IN THIS RESPECT.

4. THE CONVENTION MUST NOT CONTAIN ANY DISCRIMINATION OF STATES. A BAN ON MANUFACTURE WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO ALL STATES EQUALLY. A C-WEAPONS CONVENTION SHOULD NOT ONLY ENVISAGE THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

BUT EQUALLY THE STOCKPILING OF WARFARE AGENTS AND SHOULD THEREFORE PROVIDE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS.

5. GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ENSURING EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, A STEP BY STEP APPROACH SHOULD BE ADOPTED. END QUOTE.

3. ON FRIDAY, MARCH 4, NON-PAPER WAS GIVEN TO FRG EMBOFF IN RESPONSE TO FRG DISCUSSION PAPER. TEXT OF NON-PAPER FOLLOWS:
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 049286

BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE CONCERN OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT, IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A CW PROHIBITION, CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE NATO ALLIES BE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TEXT OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) CONVENTION BEGIN. THE US BELIEVES IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR NATO TO STUDY PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GOVERN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON CW. WHILE WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO A PROPOSAL TO HOLD SUCH CONSULTATIONS DURING MARCH, US PARTICIPATION IN NATO DISCUSSIONS AT THIS TIME COULD ONLY BE VERY LIMITED FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED BELOW.

2. THE US IS PRESENTLY IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A STUDY OF CW POLICY ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL AND MILITARY POSTURE ALTERNATIVES. BEFORE TAKING DECISIONS ON THE US POSITION FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, THE US WISHES TO INFORM THE PRINCIPAL ALLIES OF THE NATURE OF THIS STUDY AND TO OBTAIN THEIR VIEWS. WE HAVE BEEN PREPARING A PROPOSAL TO HOLD BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRG IN BONN JUST PRIOR TO THE CCD MEETINGS ON CW. SUCH CONSULTATIONS COULD BE MUCH MORE EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE HELD IN THE BROADER NATO FORUM. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT THE PROPOSAL WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

3. SINCE THE US HAS NOT COMPLETED ITS POLICY REVIEW WE WILL NOT BE PREPARED IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO TAKE A DEFINITIVE POSITION ON SOME OF THE PRINCIPLES PRESENTED IN THE FRG DISCUSSION PAPER, EVEN THOUGH THEY APPEAR GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN VIEWS. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME FULL DISCUSSION IN NATO ONCE OUR POLICY REVIEW IS COMPLETED.

4. US REPRESENTATIVES AT THE CCD INFORMAL MEETINGS ON CW AND AT THE BILATERAL US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS IN EARLY APRIL WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL ISSUES RELATED TO CW
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 049286

LIMITATIONS. THEY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, BE AUTHORIZED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS OF A CW AGREEMENT.

5. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE WESTERN GROUP AT THE CCD TO DISCUSS THE CCD'S INFORMAL MEETINGS ON CW IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH A VIEW TO ARRIVING AT A COMMON APPROACH. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY VIEWS OF THE FRG ON THIS QUESTION. END TEXT.

CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISARMAMENT, POLICIES, TEXT, PAPERS, CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 05-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE049286
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: RMIKULAK
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770076-0819
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770389/aaaadace.tel
Line Count: 381
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 00b612bd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3194683
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FRG PROPOSAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONSULTATIONS
TAGS: PARM, GE, US, CCD
To: BONN
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/00b612bd-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009